Prof. Dr. Alfred Endres

• Until 31.07.2018: Faculty of Economics, holder of the Chair of Economics, esp. economic theory
• 01.08.2018 to 31.07.2021: Senior Advisor in the “Energy, Environment & Sustainability” research center
• 01.08.2021 to 31.07.2024: Director of the “Energy, Environment & Sustainability” research center
• Since 01.08.2024: Member of the E/E/S Advisory Board

(in the fields covered by the research center)

• Cooperative solutions to global environmental problems
  If each state were to simply make autonomous decisions about its emissions of global pollutants, the result would be an emission level (“Nash equilibrium”) that would be too high when measured against the criteria of welfare economics (“global optimum”) and ecology (“Earth’s pollution limits”). This is where international environmental treaties offer a solution. However, given a number of pervasive free-rider problems, it is difficult to draft them in an effective (“compatibility of incentives”) manner. We are exploring options that make cooperative solutions more attractive to individual states.
• Environmental policy and progress in environmental technology
  In environmental economics, environmental policy instruments are traditionally judged primarily in terms of their efficiency. However, the selection and design of these instruments can also create incentives for inducing progress in environmental technology. We study the “dynamic incentive effect” of different designs for emissions taxes, emissions allowances, and environmental liability law. This analysis is carried out in respect of national and international situations. The latter design leads to interesting synergies with the research project on global environmental governance mentioned above.
• The economic theory of environmental liability law
  In the legal literature, liability law is predominantly portrayed as an instrument for settling claims for damage compensation. From an economic perspective, on the other hand, its preventive function is paramount. Under certain ideal typical conditions, the preventive effect of different designs of liability law (fault liability and strict liability) is equivalent and optimal. (This is a variant of the Coase theorem) When more realistic conditions prevail, however, this no longer applies. By modeling different frameworks, we explore a differentiated profile of the preventative properties of different liability rules.