

# The migration of professionals within the EU: any barriers left?

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## Abstract

Despite the effort at EU level to harmonize the process of recognition of foreign educational qualifications, the European states differ in their propensity to accept high-school and academic certificates obtained in other EU member states. In turn, a country's higher degree of recognition of foreign qualifications might be an attractor of non-native skilled workers. We provide evidence on this issue using new data on the outcome of the recognition process in every EU country. Estimating different panel data gravity models, we find that the migration rate to a given destination country is positively affected by its propensity to recognize foreign educational qualifications.

Keywords: International migration, Professional Labour Markets, Panel Data

JEL codes: F22, J44, C23

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# 1 Introduction

Although free labour mobility is one of the pillars of the EU (see Art. 3 of the Treaty on European Union), frictions to the movement of workers may still exist. For example, cross-country differences in labour and housing markets, the difficulty to transfer welfare and social benefits or the imperfect portability of pension rights are all factors which may hinder intra-EU mobility. In this paper, we deal with another highly debated topic: the destination country's propensity to recognize educational and professional qualifications acquired in another EU member state. The policy relevance of this issue is undoubted and proved by the EU legislative activity on this subject since its establishment. Despite the effort at EU level to harmonize the rules for the recognition of foreign qualifications, empirical evidence is so far missing on whether higher recognition of professional qualifications spurs intra-EU mobility. We fill this gap by addressing the following research question: is the propensity of an EU country to recognize foreign educational qualifications positively linked to the attraction of EU skilled immigrants?

A positive answer to the above question would seem straightforward, since a wider recognition of degrees and certificates acquired in other EU countries makes it easier for EU (labor) immigrants to search for a job within the EU. Thus, the higher the propensity of a destination country to accept foreign qualifications, the higher its probability should be to attract qualified workers. The latter point is nowadays at the core of the political discussion in several European countries, which have to face the problem of fulfilling the demand for high-skilled workers.

The actual application of the European regulations still depends on the single member states and their national legislations. Given the margin of discretion left by the EU rules, there exists a sizeable amount of cross-country heterogeneity

in the level of harmonization, thus on the propensity of recognition. Neither the former, nor the latter are directly observable. However, the propensity of recognition is likely mirrored by the outcome of the recognition process in any given country. Indeed, the request for the acknowledgement of a qualification obtained abroad may not necessarily lead to an immediate and positive recognition. Hence, we construct proxies for the country propensity to accept foreign qualifications based on available data on the number of recognitions in EU member states.

We match the information on recognitions with new bilateral data on migration stocks by skill-level to estimate a gravity model of migration. This approach allows us not only to evaluate the role of the propensity of recognition as an attractor of European migrants, but also to explore to which extent “classical” migration push and pull factors are effective at the EU level, and how their impact compares to the one of our main variable of interest. When estimating different versions of a gravity panel data model, all our results reveal, as expected, a positive relationship between the scale of migration rates and the propensity of recognition. Specifically, such a relationship is highly significant when we estimate a model including time, origin and destination country effects, as it is commonly done in the migration gravity literature. Alternative specifications and sensitivity analysis confirm the overall baseline result, i.e. that the easiness of recognition of foreign qualifications has a positive impact on the intra-EU mobility of workers, but the effect becomes modest.

**Related Literature.** As several works on the economic assimilation of immigrants have found, immigrants experience a worsening in their wage and occupational status once they first access the host country labour market (Friedberg, 2000; Chiswick et al., 2005). The magnitude of this drop depends, among other things, on the easiness of the skill-transferability from one country to

the other, and it can in some cases lead to a serious problem of over-education among the immigrant population. High-skilled individuals are typically the ones who suffer the most from such a skill-depreciation (see, for example, Chiswick and Miller, 2008, 2009; Nielsen, 2011).

Inspired by the above results and considerations, our paper treats the imperfect recognition of educational qualifications and the uncertainty surrounding it as equivalent to a migration cost. Forward-looking agents should take that cost into account before taking the migration decision and when assessing their economic opportunities in a given destination. Hence, the removal of this kind of barrier has a high potential to ease intra-EU mobility, especially for high-skilled individuals, and to become a policy instrument to promote the in-migration of talents. As noted by Dustmann and Glitz (2011), the attraction and successful labour market assimilation of qualified workers benefit first of all the host country because the more immigrants earn, the more they will contribute to the tax and benefit system of the host country as well as to per-capita GDP.

From the methodological point of view, our paper falls into the vast body of literature estimating gravity models of migration. Originally born and still widely used to analyse the determinants of bilateral trade flows, the gravity approach has been successfully applied later on in migration research to identify the migration effects of several factors, most notably migration networks (Pedersen et al., 2008), income opportunities in the destination country (see, for instance, Ortega and Peri, 2013), migration policies and labour mobility restrictions (Ortega and Peri, 2013; Palmer and Pytlikova, 2015) and cultural barriers (Belot and Ederveen, 2012). As already mentioned, our aim is the identification of the effect of the “propensity to recognize foreign degrees” on bilateral migration rates and consequently on the possibility for EU profession-

als to practice in any of the EU states, independently of the country where they obtained their degree. In so doing, we contribute to the existing literature by providing the first empirical evidence on the implications of the recognition of foreign qualifications for labour mobility at the macro level.

Similarly to the previous literature, we are concerned with potential endogeneity issues in our model. As we will explain in further detail in what follows, both our main variable of interest and the geographical distance may suffer from endogeneity bias due to unobserved bilateral heterogeneity. Indeed, the propensity to recognize qualifications acquired in a given origin may be influenced by unobserved country-pair similarities. Moreover, the geographical distance might be biased if reflecting unobserved preferences of individuals from a given origin to move to a particular destination for historical or cultural reasons. Furthermore, there might be a problem of reverse causality, since destinations with higher migration rates from a given origin might be more prone to integrate those migrants in their labour markets. Reverse causality can also be linked with signal effects in the labour market: indeed, the higher the stock of migrants that obtained the qualification in a given origin, the higher the propensity of employers of a given destination to have more experience and information when hiring those immigrants.

We tackle the unobserved heterogeneity at the country pair level estimating a fixed effects model. We also depart from the standard approaches by using a Hausman-Taylor approach, following a strand of trade literature that deals with the endogeneity of several bilateral variables, and especially of the geographical distance (see for instance, Egger and Pfaffermayr, 2004; Egger, 2004). Similarly to those empirical works, we find that the deterrent effect of the distance on migration patterns is much higher than estimated without taking endogeneity into account.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the EU institutional background around the harmonization of the rules governing the recognition of foreign qualifications. Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 shows the first empirical specification and the estimation results. We discuss and estimate alternative specifications in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.

## **2 Institutional background**

This section provides an overview on the intense legislative activity of the European Union promoting the mutual recognition of professional qualifications. Besides confirming the already highlighted policy relevance of this issue, this section also clarifies some concepts and features of the data we use in our empirical analysis.

The harmonization of the education and qualification systems across member states has been one of the pillars to ease the achievement of a common European labour market. The start of the Bologna process in the nineties and the establishment of a European Higher Education Area (EHEA) were among the first initiatives in this direction. Through the Bologna process, the EU countries have adopted similar standards for the quality and structure of their higher education systems. The acknowledgment of educational and professional qualifications is another necessary step to reach the goal of harmonization. To this aim, the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union (Art. 53) already allows the Council and the Parliament to issue directives on this subject. The principle underlying the mutual recognition is the following: any profession or form of work requiring a particular qualification in an EU member state can be practiced also by EU nationals who acquired a similar qualification in a different EU country. This is equivalent to introducing substitutability

of academic and professional qualifications throughout the EU. Hence, the application of the above principle should ensure free mobility within the EU, avoiding any workers' discrimination and reducing the barriers to the movement of labour. The EU legislation for the free movement of professionals is quite articulated: the EU directives dating back to the nineties cover the recognition of the qualifications for which a high school diploma and an university degree are needed. They also establish specific rules applying to different professional categories.

In 2005 the EU issued a directive on the harmonization of the regulated professions (Directive 2005/36 EC), which consolidates the existing norms and was implemented in 2007. It applies to all the EEA countries and Switzerland, and it concerns a wide range of professions.<sup>1</sup> In particular, it applies to the sectoral professions,<sup>2</sup> to the trade-industry-business professions and to other professions that might be either regulated or not in a given EU country.

The Directive distinguishes among four broad schemes of recognition. The first one is the “general system,” which applies to individuals wishing to settle in the host country. The professional qualifications of the immigrant are recognized if they are at least equivalent to the level immediately prior to that which is required in the host state. Under the general system, the recognition is granted also if the immigrant has practiced a given profession for two years, even if the profession is not regulated in the home country. In some cases, the destination country may check the qualifications by requiring some compensation measures, e.g. adaptation periods, tests or exams.

The second case is the “automatic recognition,” which applies to the above-

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<sup>1</sup>The Directive does not apply to “sailors, statutory auditors, insurance intermediaries and air controllers, or to some other professions in the field of transport or linked to activities involving toxic products” (see [http://ec.europa.eu/internal\\_market/qualifications/other\\_directives/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/qualifications/other_directives/index_en.htm)). These categories are regulated by different directives.

<sup>2</sup>The sectoral professions comprise architects, dentists, doctors, midwives, nurses, pharmacists and veterinary surgeons.

mentioned sectoral professions. The third case deals with the “recognition of professional experience”: individuals working in the craft, commerce or industry sector may be required to take some traineeship or test whenever their qualifications significantly differ from the ones required in the host country for practicing a given profession. Otherwise, they are granted the recognition under one of the two previous systems. Finally, the “temporary mobility” system applies to professionals wishing to practice temporarily in another EU country: in this case, a permit or a registration lasting at most one year is required.<sup>3</sup> Despite the effort to harmonize the existing rules and regulations, no single solution exists among the EU countries; in fact, the rules and compensation measures are left to the discretion of every member state. Hence, from an individual perspective, the process of having one’s qualifications accepted and recognized may be complex and long, and it may involve non-negligible monetary and non-monetary costs. Table 1 provides some figures on the outcome of the application process for selected European destinations.<sup>4</sup> For each host country, we report the total number of applications received in the 1997-2014 period, and the number of positive, negative and pending decisions. A given degree of heterogeneity is already apparent from this table, but the differences within a given destination might be even more pronounced once we disaggregate by country of origin. For example, as shown in Table 1, the overall rate of recognition in Germany is 60 percent. However, if we only consider the applications coming from Austria, the Netherlands, and Poland (i.e. the three countries from which most applications come in the considered period), Poland has the lowest acceptance rate (41 percent), while Austria and the Netherlands are at around 71 and 77 percent, respectively. Considering that Germany is

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<sup>3</sup>The data on the recognition that we use for the empirical analysis refer to the first three systems, excluding the “temporary mobility” case.

<sup>4</sup>The host countries are the ones included in our estimation sample. See note to Table 1 for details.

one of the preferred European destinations for Polish migrants, this hints that frictions in the application of the norms might really be detrimental for the labour market integration of immigrants.

Finally, observe that the information reported in Table 1 suggests that the number of total applications in the destination country is lower than the number of EU immigrants to such destination. For instance, according to OECD data, the inflows of EU immigrants to Germany in the 2000s is around 3 millions individuals<sup>5</sup>, a considerably higher number than the total volume of applications received in Germany in the same period, as reported in Table 1. Clearly, this is explained by the fact that not all immigrants hold an educational or professional certification, hence they do not need to apply for the recognition. Additionally, as previously mentioned, the available data do not cover the “temporary mobility” system, namely the case where the application is made to practice the profession abroad only temporarily. Another reason for the discrepancy between the total applications and the number of immigrants could be that employers might not require any formal process of recognition. Beside the mentioned explanations, the relatively low number of applications may be a signal either of the poor capacity of a country to attract professionals or of the frictions associated with the recognition process. Whether there is an association between the country tendency to recognize foreign education and to attract the migration of professional is indeed the research question tackled by the following empirical analysis.

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<sup>5</sup>Source of the data: own calculations based on the OECD international Migration Database.

Table 1: Positive, negative and pending recognitions for any destination country. Period: 1997-2014, row frequencies in italics.

	Positive	Negative	Pending	Total
Austria	19016	1801	857	21674
	<i>0.88</i>	<i>0.08</i>	<i>0.04</i>	
Denmark	7963	554	1163	9680
	<i>0.82</i>	<i>0.06</i>	<i>0.12</i>	
Finland	3862	8	281	4151
	<i>0.93</i>	<i>0.00</i>	<i>0.07</i>	
France	7924	255	2174	10353
	<i>0.77</i>	<i>0.02</i>	<i>0.21</i>	
Germany	24061	2205	13910	40176
	<i>0.60</i>	<i>0.05</i>	<i>0.35</i>	
Ireland	18850	421	1458	20729
	<i>0.91</i>	<i>0.02</i>	<i>0.07</i>	
Luxembourg	6568	86	1	6655
	<i>0.99</i>	<i>0.01</i>	<i>0.00</i>	
Netherlands	9029	921	1198	11148
	<i>0.81</i>	<i>0.08</i>	<i>0.11</i>	
Norway	40132	4554	358	45044
	<i>0.89</i>	<i>0.10</i>	<i>0.01</i>	
Portugal	1713	102	570	2385
	<i>0.72</i>	<i>0.04</i>	<i>0.24</i>	
Spain	6502	778	490	7770
	<i>0.84</i>	<i>0.10</i>	<i>0.06</i>	
Sweden	9548	709	1678	11935
	<i>0.80</i>	<i>0.06</i>	<i>0.14</i>	
Switzerland	23818	28	2845	26691
	<i>0.89</i>	<i>0.00</i>	<i>0.11</i>	
United Kingdom	82313	5743	7656	95712
	<i>0.86</i>	<i>0.06</i>	<i>0.08</i>	

Source: Regulated Profession Database (European Commission), authors' elaboration. "Total" is the number of applications received in the host countries. It consists of all qualifications obtained in any EEA country, Switzerland included. The reported countries are only the ones in our estimation sample. Data refer to the cases of "general system," "automatic recognition" and "recognition of professional experience". Data for the "temporary mobility" case are not available.

### 3 Data and variables

In this section we describe the main data sources we use for our estimation and we provide details on the construction of the main variables of interest.

**The IAB Brain Drain Dataset.** The source of data for immigrants is the “Brain-drain” dataset (source: Institute for Employment Research, IAB), a new database containing information on bilateral stocks of immigrants by country of birth and level of education, with five year frequency, from 1980 to 2010. We use this information to construct our dependent variable, i.e. the migration rate for any origin-destination country pair. Following the definition used in the IAB Brain-drain dataset, we consider as high-skill those individuals with tertiary education, i.e. with higher than high-school leaving certificate or equivalent (see Brücker et al., 2013). Instead, the medium-skill comprise individuals with secondary education, i.e. with high-school leaving certificate or equivalent. We define the bilateral migration rate as the ratio between the total stocks of high and medium skill immigrants from a given origin country in a given destination over the sum of the population of the origin country with the same skill level plus the stock of high and medium skill from the given origin to all the EU destinations considered in the sample.<sup>6</sup> Hence, the bilateral migration rate from a given origin  $o$  to a given destination  $d$  at time  $t$  is defined as:

$$\text{Rate}_{odt} = \frac{(\text{Stock High} + \text{Stock Med.})_{odt}}{(\text{Pop. High} + \text{Pop. Med.})_{ot} + \sum_d (\text{Stock High} + \text{Stock Med.})_{odt}} \quad (1)$$

Observe that the stocks of migrants and population contain people aged 25 and older. Hence, the data are unlikely to include students who migrated for

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<sup>6</sup>In our main empirical analysis we aggregate high and medium skill immigrants when computing the migration rate. This is done for consistency with the “Regulated Professions Database,” which does not allow to distinguish between professions requiring the high-school diploma and those requiring tertiary education. Regression results for high and medium skilled migration rates separately are presented in the online appendix.

educational reasons (Brücker et al., 2013). This feature of the data is desirable in our case since we are interested in the mobility of professionals, excluding students.

One potential shortcoming of the bilateral migration stocks we use is that they do not contain information on the country of education. This means that they might include individuals who have studied in the destination country, and hence are not relevant for our research question (Beine et al., 2007). Ideally, then, we should select those individuals out of the estimation sample and compute the migration rates only on those who migrated after completing tertiary education in their origin country (i.e. country of birth). One way of doing this could be, as in Beine et al. (2007), controlling for the age of entry in the destination and considering the immigrants who entered after a given age (e.g. after age 22 according to Beine et al.'s definition (2007)) as educated in the country of origin (birth). However, immigrants' age of entry is only obtainable from answers to Census questions that are not always asked, or are hardly comparable across Censuses. The only existing dataset displaying the stocks of immigrants by age of entry is the one developed by the above cited authors, which contains figures on the number of high-skill immigrants aged 22 years and older, by age of entry and for the census-years 1991 and 2001. Using this data would allow us to perform only a cross-section estimation, hence losing the advantage of a longer time-frame.

Moreover, as Beine et al. (2007) show, the migration rates corrected for age at entry are highly correlated with the ones computed using the Doquier and Marfouk dataset (2006), which applies a totally similar methodology as the IAB-Brain-Drain dataset.<sup>7</sup> So, even if our migration rates might be too high (since they might also contain individuals who acquired education in the destination

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<sup>7</sup>The IAB-Brain-Drain dataset can actually be considered an extension of Doquier and Marfouk (2006) along the time and gender dimensions.

country), they are likely to closely covary with the ones by age of entry. At least qualitatively, then, our results should still provide a useful piece of evidence on the problem under examination. Finally, in the subsample of individuals who studied in the destination country, according to our line of reasoning, the correlation between incidence of recognition and migration should be zero. Indeed, immigrants who acquired education in the destination country do not need to apply for the recognition of their education at destination. But, as we have previously anticipated, we provide evidence of a positive relationship between the destination country’s propensity to recognize foreign qualifications and the migration rate to that destination. Such a relation can only reflect the behaviour of those individuals who studied in the country of origin.<sup>8</sup>

**The Regulated Professions Database.** To compute the probability of recognition of qualification in the destination country, we use the “Regulated Professions Database”, provided by the European Commission, which has information on each EU member state’s number of applications for recognition of academic and professional qualifications acquired in any other EU country. The data refer to the “general system, “automatic recognition” and “recognition of professional experience” cases (see the Institutional Background section for details). Data are available for all the EU28 and EEA countries, from 1997 to 2014. While the frequency is biannual from 1997 to 2006, it is annual for the remaining time period. The country’s propensity and attitude toward the recognition process may be influenced by different observed and unobserved factors. For instance, it may depend on the general level of bureaucracy and

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<sup>8</sup>Another minor concern would regard those migrants who studied in a third country (i.e. neither the origin nor the destination). The little existing evidence on this topic suggests that this is likely to be a very small group. For example, for Germany, own computations based on the IAB-SOEP New Migration sample show that in 2013 the total number of interviewed immigrants who had at least one episode of migration in a third country (where they could have acquired some education), is just 76 out of 3,710 individuals.

on the burden of administrative procedures that are country specific. The difficulty to measure the country’s attitude toward the recognition process requires the use of proxies. The most obvious way is to look at the “frequency” of the recognition process in the destination country. Hence, using the data of the Regulated Professions Database, we build the following indicator:

$$\text{Propensity of Recognition}_{odt} = \frac{\text{Positive Applications}_{odt-1}}{\sum_o \text{Total Applications}_{odt-1}} \quad (2)$$

The above measure is defined as the ratio between the number of certificates obtained in a given origin country and recognized by a given destination (i.e. with positive outcome) and the total number of applications submitted to the destination country. The latter is the sum of successful applications (i.e. with a positive outcome), rejected applications (negative outcome) and of the applications with a neutral outcome (i.e. the applications for which the decision is pending).<sup>9</sup> To build the indicator for t=2000, we use the number of applications from 1997 to 1999 due to data availability. Similarly, the indicator for t=2005 contains the applications received from 2000 to 2004, while the indicator for t=2010 uses data from 2005 to 2009. We pool the data for different years since the data from 1997 to 2006 are with biannual frequency, so we cannot disaggregate them. The propensity of recognition is lagged by one period, i.e. the indicator for the first year contains the number of applications up to 1999<sup>10</sup>. We do so since expect that the reaction of the migration rates to the propensity of a given destination country to recognize educational qualifications may not be instantaneous. Observe that the indicator could capture the size of migrants

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<sup>9</sup>Observe that the same individuals may apply more than once; for instance, if an individual receives a negative application in a given year, he might re-apply later.

<sup>10</sup>Descriptive statistics of both the migration rates and the propensity indicator are reported in the online Appendix. As a robustness check, we also use an alternative indicator of the propensity of recognition, constructed by using the total applications with positive outcome in a given destination at the denominator. See the online Appendix for details on the construction of this alternative indicator and the respective estimation results.

from a particular origin to a given destination or the capacity of the latter to attract immigrants from a given origin.<sup>11</sup>

**Other variables and sources.** We also control for regressors commonly found in the gravity literature: the distance between capitals (source: own calculations based on CEPII data on latitudes and longitudes of the capitals), the difference between GDP in the origin and the destination countries (source: World Bank, WDI indicators) and the population in the destination country (source: UN “World Population Prospect” database).

**Sample selection.** Due to data availability, we restrict the sample to the years 2000, 2005 and 2010. This time-period is characterized by the attempt to harmonize the regulation on the recognition of professional and academic qualifications at the EU level. moreover, the completion of the Single European Labour Market has started from the 2000s, with the 2004 and 2007 EU enlargements and with the gradual removal of the transitional arrangements to the free labor mobility. As destinations, we have data for 14 EU member states before the enlargements, i.e. the destinations taken from the EU15 and the EEA countries including also Switzerland. As origin, we use 29 countries taken from the EU27 and EEA countries, Switzerland included.<sup>12</sup> We thus have a balanced panel dataset, with three years (i.e. 2000, 2005 and 2010), 1095 observations and 365 country-pairs.

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<sup>11</sup>Suppose that the propensity of recognition of a given destination  $d$  from the origin country  $A$  is higher than the propensity of the same destination from a different origin country  $B$ . This could be due to the fact that destination  $d$  attracts a higher number of immigrants from  $A$  than from  $B$ .

<sup>12</sup>The destination countries are Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and UK. Unfortunately, data on migration stocks for the other EU15 destination countries, i.e. Belgium, Greece and Italy, are not available. As origin countries we have Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and UK. Croatia is not included since it entered the EU after 2010.

## 4 Empirical analysis and results

We investigate the relationship between our main variables of interest by first estimating the following model:

$$\begin{aligned} Rate_{odt} = & \delta_0 + \delta_1 \text{Propensity of Recognition}_{od(t-1)} + \delta_2 \text{DIST}_{od} \\ & + \delta_3 \text{GDP-diff}_{odt} + \delta_4 \text{POP}_{dt} + \epsilon_{odt} \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

Where  $Rate_{odt}$  is the logarithm of the migration rate and Propensity of Recognition is the previously described indicator lagged one period. We expect to find a positive estimated coefficient of the indicator: the higher the propensity of a destination to recognize foreign educational qualifications, the higher the migration rate to that country. The remaining control variables are the bilateral distance between origin and destination ( $\text{DIST}_{od}$ ), the difference between origin and destination GDP ( $\text{GDP-diff}_{odt}$ ) and the population in the destination country ( $\text{POP}_{dt}$ ). As mentioned in the introduction, we first estimate a model making the following assumption for the error term, i.e.

$$\epsilon_{odt} = \alpha_d + \alpha_o + \alpha_t + \alpha_{ot} + \eta_{odt}. \quad (4)$$

This means that the error term includes destination ( $\alpha_d$ ), origin ( $\alpha_o$ ), time ( $\alpha_t$ ), and origin-by-time ( $\alpha_{ot}$ ) effects. Based on assumption (4), we estimate Least Squares Dummy Variables (LSDV) specifications. The regressions results, displayed in Table 2, point out the following: the propensity of recognition of foreign certificates in the destination country turns out to be a pull-factor of European migrants of any skill-level. Indeed, in the specifications of Table 2, the

coefficient of the propensity of acceptance is positive and statistically significant at 1 percent level. The coefficient indicates that a one percentage point increase in a given destination of the propensity to recognize certificates obtained in a given origin is associated to a 3.4 to 4 percent higher migration rate. Moreover, the bilateral distance has the expected negative sign and is highly significant. In line with the gravity literature of migration, this result seems to indicate that moving costs represent a deterrent to migration, even when relatively close countries are considered, such as in the European context. Observe that when comparing the model specifications in Table 2, the specification including all time and country dummies (LSDV-3) is preferred using both the AIC criterion and the BIC criterion.<sup>13</sup>

## 5 Alternative specifications

The previously estimated specifications might be plagued by endogeneity problems due to unobserved heterogeneity at the country-pair level. We are particularly concerned with the possible bias of two of our bilateral explanatory variables: the incidence of recognition indicator and the distance. The former might be endogenous if, for example, countries with a higher concentration of migrants are also more prone to efficiently implement the rules on the recognition of certificates. In the same vein, the propensity of recognition may be demand-driven: the need for a particular profession in the destination country may imply a higher tendency to “import” it, thus making the recognition process easier. The geographical distance may also be correlated with the bilateral unobserved propensity to experience migratory flows, e.g. for given

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<sup>13</sup>The results shown remain stable even after disaggregating the sample into high or medium skill migrants and they confirm an overall importance of the recognition of qualifications to attract European migrants. See the online appendix for these additional results.

Table 2: Migration rates and propensity of recognition. Baseline estimation results.

*Dependent variable:*

*Log migration rate*

	(LSDV-1)	(LSDV-2)	(LSDV-3)	(LSDV-4)
Propensity of Recognition	4.074*** (0.627)	4.315*** (0.592)	3.418*** (0.522)	3.440*** (0.540)
GDP difference	0.349*** (0.108)	-0.300*** (0.066)	0.087* (0.046)	0.249*** (0.055)
Population destination	0.454*** (0.040)	0.331*** (0.094)	0.563*** (0.093)	0.674*** (0.108)
Distance	-1.038*** (0.119)	-0.721*** (0.118)	-1.379*** (0.155)	-1.377*** (0.159)
$R^2$	0.561	0.596	0.713	0.718
Obs.	1039	1039	1039	1039
Aic	3348.879	3236.231	2934.846	3021.447
Bic	3512.098	3335.152	3162.363	3506.157
Constant	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Origin dummies	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Destination dummies	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Origin*Year dummies	No	No	No	Yes

Notes: standard errors clustered at the country pair level. \*significant at 10%, \*\* significant at 5%, \*\*\* significant at 1%. “Propensity of Recognition 1” is the number of certificates obtained in a given origin country and accepted by a given destination at time t, over the total number of applications submitted to the destination country at time t.

cultural or historical reasons.<sup>14</sup>

Therefore, differently from the model specified above, we now introduce time and bilateral effects, making the following assumption on the error term:

$$\epsilon_{odt} = \alpha_{od} + \alpha_t + \eta_{odt} \quad (5)$$

<sup>14</sup>Also reverse causality can be an issue: even if we cannot exclude it, we mitigate this type of endogeneity looking at the destination country’s propensity of recognition lagged in time with respect to the migration movements.

A random effect model (RE), a fixed effect model (FE) and a correlated random effect model (CRE) are estimated. While the FE allows for correlation among the explanatory variables and the unobserved bilateral component, the RE assumes absence of correlation. In the CRE specification, we model the relationship between the country-pair effects and the regressors (as in the approach of Mundlak, 1978<sup>15</sup>). In case of correlation of the explanatory variables with the unobserved heterogeneity at the country-pair level, the RE gives biased estimates. With the FE model, we get rid of all the bilateral unobserved heterogeneity. However, the main drawback of the FE approach in our case is that, with 365 fixed effects over a total estimation sample of less than 2000 observations, it causes a non-negligible loss of degrees of freedom. This unavoidably undermines the significance of the estimated coefficients. Moreover, due to data constraints, only a limited time variation across the country-pairs can be exploited (indeed, we have a short panel where  $t=3$ ). To tackle the correlation of the explanatory variables with the unobserved bilateral heterogeneity, we also use a Hausman-Taylor estimation approach (Hausman and Taylor, 1981). This method has already been applied in the gravity trade literature (see, for instance, Egger, 2004 and Egger and Pfaffermayr, 2004) to address the possible endogeneity of the distance. Similarly to our case, the underlying hypothesis is that the distance might be correlated with the unobserved bilateral propensity to trade. Moreover, the approach can be used as a sensitivity analysis since it allows us to identify the regressors that are the sources of correlation with the bilateral component (as in Egger, 2004). The Hausman-Taylor method exploits the uncorrelatedness of some of the covariates with  $\alpha_{od}$  to consistently and efficiently estimate the coefficients of both the time invariant and time-variant endogenous regressors.<sup>16</sup> Intuitively, the procedure uses the deviation from the

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<sup>15</sup>See the online appendix for the details on the CRE model.

<sup>16</sup>The online Appendix contains a technical and more detailed explanation of the method.

individual means of the exogenous time-variant variables to instrument the time-variant endogenous regressors, while their individual means are used as instruments for the time-invariant covariates. Furthermore, the Hausman-Taylor approach offers the possibility to test the correlation of our variables of interest with  $\alpha_{od}$  using a standard Hausman-type test.

Table 3 shows the estimated coefficients from the RE, the FE and the CRE models. In the first panel of Table 3, the coefficient of the Propensity of Recognition 1 is highly significant and equal to 0.919 in the RE model, while it decreases to 0.521 in the FE model, where it is significant at the 5 per cent level (this may be due to the above-mentioned loss of degrees of freedom). Similarly to the FE model, the estimated coefficient of the indicator for the CRE model is equal to 0.520. The variable addition test does not accept the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the mean groups of the regressors in the CRE model (not reported in Table 3 for notational simplicity) are jointly equal to 0. Hence, the test suggests that the FE specification is preferred to the RE model (see the online appendix for details on the test). This suggests that 1 percent increase of the propensity of recognition is associated to a 0.5 percent increase of the migration rate to the destination country. The last two columns of Table 3 reports the estimation results from the Hausman-Taylor model. Specifically, in HT-1 only the time invariant regressor (i.e. the distance) is considered correlated with  $\alpha_{od}$  and hence instrumented. In HT-2 both the distance and the indicator are instrumented. We observe that the coefficients of the indicators of the “Propensity of Recognition” obtained in both HT-1 and HT-2 are equal to the ones in the FE. This might indicate that the indicator is not the source of correlation, especially because the Hausman test does not reject the null of no-correlation even after the instrumentation of the distance only (see column HT-1)<sup>17</sup>. The coefficient of the distance is still highly significant in HT-1, and

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<sup>17</sup>The online appendix contains a detailed explanation of the test.

it increases in absolute value with respect to the RE model.

The lower coefficient and significance in the FE and HT models than in the baseline specifications indicate that the positive effect of the propensity of a destination to recognize foreign qualifications on migration rates is less strong when we account for the possible correlation with the bilateral unobserved heterogeneity. Indeed, the estimated effect drops from 4 to 0.5 percent increase of the migration rate for a 1 percent increase of the indicator. This set of results also indicates that the effect of distance in our previous results was upward biased and suggests that unobserved bilateral factors like individual preferences or cultural similarity could attenuate the role of distance within the European context. Hence, Importantly, this finding proves that there still exist geographical moving costs, even within the EU and even for high-skilled individuals.

## 6 Conclusions

Motivated by the possible existence of frictions to the free labour mobility within the EU, we provide the first empirical evidence on the effect of the mutual recognition of educational and professional qualifications on the migration of workers. Specifically, we analyse whether the propensity of a country to recognize foreign qualifications affects the migration rate to that destination country. Using new bilateral data on the recognition of foreign qualifications in the EU, we build two indicators to proxy the propensity of recognition and we estimate different versions of a gravity panel data model. The first model, which includes time and country effects, confirms that the propensity to recognize foreign qualifications positively affects the migration rate. Moreover, as commonly found in gravity models of migration, the bilateral geographical

Table 3: Migration rates and propensity of recognition. Alternative specifications results.

*Dependent variable:*

*Migration rate*

	RE	FE	CRE	HT-1	HT-2
Propensity of Recognition	0.919*** (0.273)	0.521** (0.257)	0.520** (0.257)	0.520* (0.275)	0.521* (0.278)
Distance	-0.780*** (0.105)	–	-0.670*** (0.102)	-1.460*** (0.392)	3.085 (2.267)
$R^2$	0.427	0.979	0.465		
Obs.	1039	1039	1039	1039	1039
<i>Variable addition test</i>					
$\chi^2_3$	–	–	42.94***		
<i>Over-identification test</i>					
$\chi^2_3$				1.95	0.06

Notes: All regressions include a constant. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the country-pair level for RE, FE and CRE models, and bootstrap-clustered (200 replications) at the country-pair level for HT-1 and HT-2. \*significant at 10%, \*\* significant at 5%, \*\*\* significant at 1%. Additional controls: difference between GDP of origin and destination country, population in the destination country, year dummies. The coefficients of mean groups of the regressors in the CRE are not reported. Chi squared statistic (3 degrees of freedom) of the variable addition test. The null hypothesis is that the coefficients of the mean group variables in the CRE are jointly equal to 0. See Table 2 and eq. (2) for the definition of Propensity of Recognition indicator.

distance negatively affects the migration between two countries.

To tackle the possible correlation among the bilateral explanatory variables and the country-pair unobserved heterogeneity, we specify a different version of the model including the time and the country-bilateral effects, estimated with random, fixed effects, correlated random effects and with a Hausman-Taylor approach. The positive coefficient of the indicators decreases and becomes significant at a lower level in all the FE, CRE and Hausman-Taylor specifications than in the RE.

The findings suggest the following interpretation: the propensity of a country to recognize foreign qualifications might benefit the destination country in terms of increased migration rates of the professional workers. However, the positive effect of migration rates diminishes when we account for the possible correlation between the explanatory variables and the bilateral unobserved components: the harmonization of the recognition process has only a moderate impact on the migration rates. A more efficient implementation of the EU may improve the destination country's propensity to accept foreign qualifications. In turn, this could translate into higher migration rates, attracting more qualified workers and easing their mobility.

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